Jigsaw @ AMI and HaSpeeDe2: Fine-Tuning a Pre-Trained Comment-Domain BERT Model by Lees, Alyssa et al.
 
Valerio Basile, Danilo Croce, Maria Maro and Lucia C. Passaro (dir.)
EVALITA Evaluation of NLP and Speech Tools for Italian
- December 17th, 2020
Proceedings of the Seventh Evaluation Campaign of Natural
Language Processing and Speech Tools for Italian Final Workshop
Accademia University Press
Jigsaw @ AMI and HaSpeeDe2: Fine-Tuning a Pre-
Trained Comment-Domain BERT Model
Alyssa Lees, Jeffrey Sorensen and Ian Kivlichan
DOI: 10.4000/books.aaccademia.6789
Publisher: Accademia University Press
Place of publication: Torino
Year of publication: 2020
Published on OpenEdition Books: 11 May 2021




LEES, Alyssa ; SORENSEN, Jeffrey ; and KIVLICHAN, Ian. Jigsaw @ AMI and HaSpeeDe2: Fine-Tuning a
Pre-Trained Comment-Domain BERT Model In: EVALITA Evaluation of NLP and Speech Tools for Italian -
December 17th, 2020: Proceedings of the Seventh Evaluation Campaign of Natural Language Processing and
Speech Tools for Italian Final Workshop [online]. Torino: Accademia University Press, 2020 (generated
17 mai 2021). Available on the Internet: <http://books.openedition.org/aaccademia/6789>. ISBN:
9791280136329. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/books.aaccademia.6789.
40
Jigsaw @ AMI and HaSpeeDe2: Fine-Tuning a Pre-Trained
Comment-Domain BERT Model





The Google Jigsaw team produced
submissions for two of the EVALITA
2020 (Basile et al., 2020) shared tasks,
based in part on the technology that pow-
ers the publicly available PerspectiveAPI
comment evaluation service. We present a
basic description of our submitted results
and a review of the types of errors that our
system made in these shared tasks.
1 Introduction
The HaSpeeDe2 shared task consists of Italian so-
cial media posts that have been labeled for hate
speech and stereotypes. As Jigsaw’s participation
was limited to the A and B tasks, we will be lim-
iting our analysis to that portion. The full details
of the dataset are available in the task guidelines
(Bosco et al., 2020).
The AMI task includes both raw (natural Twit-
ter) and synthetic (template-generated) datasets.
The raw data consists of Italian tweets manually
labelled and balanced according to misogyny and
aggressiveness labels, while the synthetic data is
labelled only for misogyny and is intended to
measure the presence of unintended bias (Elisa-
betta Fersini, 2020).
2 Background
Jigsaw, a team within Google, develops the Per-
spectiveAPI machine learning comment scoring
system, which is used by numerous social media
companies and publishers. Our system is based
on distillation and uses a convolutional neural-
network to score individual comments according
to several attributes using supervised training data
Copyright ©2020 for this paper by its authors. Use per-
mitted under Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 In-
ternational (CC BY 4.0).
labeled by crowd workers. Note that Perspec-
tiveAPI actually hosts a number of different mod-
els that each score different attributes. The under-
lying technology and performance of these models
has evolved over time.
While Jigsaw has hosted three separate Kaggle
competitions relevant to this competition (Jigsaw,
2018; Jigsaw, 2019; Jigsaw, 2020) we have not
traditionally participated in academic evaluations.
3 Related Work
The models we build are based on the popular
BERT architecture (Devlin et al., 2019) with dif-
ferent pre-training and fine-tuning approaches.
In part, our submissions explore the importance
of pre-training (Gururangan et al., 2020) in the
context of toxicity and the various competition at-
tributes. A core question is to what extent these
domains overlap. Jigsaw’s customized models
(used for the second HaSpeeDe2 submission, and
both AMI submissions) are pretrained on a set of
one billion user-generated comments: this imparts
statistical information to the model about com-
ments and conversations online. This model is fur-
ther fine-tuned on various toxicity attributes (toxi-
city, severe toxicity, profanity, insults, identity at-
tacks, and threats), but it is unclear how well these
should align with the competition attributes. The
descriptions of these attributes and how they were
collected from crowd workers can be found in the
data descriptions for the Jigsaw Unintended Bias
in Toxicity Classification (Jigsaw, 2019) website.
A second question studied in prior work is to
what extent training generalizes across languages
(Pires et al., 2019; Wu and Dredze, 2019; Pa-
mungkas et al., 2020). The majority of our train-
ing data is English comment data from a variety
of sources, while this competition is based on Ital-
ian Twitter data. Though multilingual transfer has
been studied in general contexts, less is known
about the specific cases of toxicity, hate speech,
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misogyny, and harassment. This was one of the fo-
cuses of Jigsaw’s recent Kaggle competition (Jig-
saw, 2020); i.e., what forms of toxicity are shared
across languages (and hence can be learned by
multilingual models) and what forms are different.
4 Submission Details










































Figure 1: ROC curves for the PerspectiveAPI
multilingual teacher model attributes compared to
the HaSpeeDe2 attributes (hate speech and stereo-
type).
















































Figure 2: ROC curves for PerspectiveAPI multi-
lingual teacher model attributes compared to the
AMI attributes (misogyny and aggressiveness).
As Jigsaw has already developed toxicity mod-
els for the Italian language, we initially hoped
that these would provide a preliminary baseline
for the competition despite the independent na-
ture of the development of the annotation guide-
lines. Our Italian models score comments for tox-
icity as well as five additional distinct toxicity at-
tributes: severe toxicity, profanity, threats, insults,
and identity attacks. We might expect some of
these attributes to correlate with the HaSpeeDe2
and AMI attributes, though it is not immediately
clear whether any of these correlations should be
particularly strong.
The current Jigsaw PerspectiveAPI models are
typically trained via distillation from a multilin-
gual teacher model (that is too large to practi-
cally serve in production) to a smaller CNN. Using
this large teacher model, we initially compared the
EVALITA hate speech and stereotype annotations
against the teacher model’s scores for different at-
tributes. The results are shown in Figure 1 for the
training data. Perspective is a reasonable detector
for the hate speech attribute, but performs less well
for the stereotype attribute, with the identity attack
model performing the best.
Using these same models on the AMI task,
shown in Figure 2 for detecting misogyny proved
even more challenging. In this case, the aggres-
siveness attribute was evaluated only on the sub-
set of the training data labeled misogynous. In
this case, the most popular attribute of “toxicity”
is actually counter-indicative of the misogyny la-
bel. The best detector for both of these attributes
appears to be the “threat” model.
As can be seen, the existing classifiers are all
poor predictors of both attributes for this shared
task. Due to errors in our initial analysis, we did
not end up using any of the models used for Per-





















news 1 0.68 0.64
2 0.64 0.68
tweets 1 0.72 0.67
2 0.77 0.74
Table 1: Macro-averaged F1 scores for Jigsaw’s
HaSpeeDe2 Submissions.
4.1 HaSpeeDe2
The Jigsaw team submitted two separate submis-
sions that were independently trained for Tasks A
and B.
4.1.1 First Submission
Our first submission, one that did not perform very
well, was based on a simple multilingual BERT
model fine-tuned on 10 random splits of the train-
ing data. For each split, 10% of the data was
held out to choose an appropriate equal-error-rate
threshold for the resulting model.
The BERT fine-tuning system used the 12 layer
model (Tensorflow Hub, 2020), a batch size of
64 and sequence length of 128. A single dense
layer is used to connect to the two output sigmoids
which are trained using a binary cross-entropy loss
42
using stochastic gradient descent with early stop-
ping, which is computed using the AUC metric
computed using the 10% held out slice. This
model is implemented using Keras (Chollet and
others, 2015).
To create the final submission, the decisions of
the ten separate classifiers were combined in a ma-
jority voting scheme (if 5 or more models pro-
duced a positive detection, the attribute was as-
signed true).
4.1.2 Second Submission
Our second submission was based on a similar ap-
proach of fine-tuning a BERT-based model, but
one based on a more closely matched training set.
The underlying technology we used is the same
as the Google Cloud AutoML for natural language
processing product that had been employed in sim-
ilar labeling applications (Bisong, 2019).
The remaining models built for this competi-
tion and in the subsequent section are based on a
customized BERT 768-dimension 12-layer model
pretrained on 1B user-generated comments using
MLM for 125 steps. This model was then fine-
tuned on supervised comments in multiple lan-
guages for six attributes: toxicity, severe toxic-
ity, obscene, threat, insult, and identity hate. This
model also uses a custom wordpiece model (Wu et
al., 2016) comprised of 200K tokens representing
tokens from hundreds of languages.
Our hate speech and misogyny models use a
fully connected final layer that combines the six
output attributes and allows weight propagation
through all layers of the network. Fine-tuning con-
tinues on using the supervised training data pro-
vided by the competition hosts using the ADAM
optimizer with a learning rate of 1e–5.
Figure 3 displays the ROC curve for our second
submission for each of the news and the tweets
datasets as well as for both the hate speech and
stereotype attributes.
Our second submission for HaSpeeDe2 con-
sisted of fine-tuning a single model with the pro-
vided training data with a 10% held-out set. The
custom BERT model was fine-tuned on TPUs us-
ing a relatively small batch size of 32.
4.2 AMI
Our submissions for the AMI task only consid-
ered the unconstrained case, due to the use of
pretrained models. All AMI models were fine-
tuned on TPUs using the customized BERT check-






























Figure 3: ROC plots for HaSpeeDe2 Test Set La-
bels.
point and custom wordpiece vocabulary from Sec-
tion 4.1.2. However, a larger batch-size of 128
was specified. All models were fine-tuned simul-
taneously on misogynous and aggressive labels
using the provided data, where zero aggressive-
ness weights were assigned to data points with no
misogynous labels.
Both submissions were based on ensembles of
partitioned models evaluated on a 10% held-out
test set. We explored two different ensembling
techniques, which we discuss in the next section.
AMI submission 1 does not not include syn-
thetic data. AMI submission 2 includes the syn-
thetic data and custom biasing mitigation data se-
lected from Wikipedia articles. Table 2 clearly
shows that the inclusion of such data significantly
improved the performance on Task B for submis-
sion 2. Interestingly, the inclusion of synthetic and
bias mitigation data slightly improved the perfor-















Table 2: Misogynous and Aggressiveness Macro-
averaged F1 scores for Jigsaw’s AMI Submis-
sions.
The two Jigsaw models ranked in first and sec-
ond place for Task A. The second submission
ranked first among participants for Task B.
43































Both the first and second submissions for AMI
were ensembles of fine-tuned custom BERT mod-
els constructed from partitioned training data. We
explored two ensembling techniques (Brownlee,
2020):
• Majority Vote: Each partitioned model was
evaluated using a model specific threshold.
The label for each attribute was determined
by majority vote among the models.
• Average: The raw models probabilities are
averaged together. The combined model cal-
culates the labels via custom thresholds de-
termined by evaluation on a held-out set.
Thresholds for the individual models in the ma-
jority vote and average ensemble were calculated
to optimize for the point on the held-out data ROC
curve where |TPR − (1− FPR)| is minimized.
The majority voting model performed slightly
better for both the misogynous and aggressive task
on the held-out sets. As such, both submissions
use majority vote.
4.2.2 First Submission
Using the same configuration as Section 4.1.2, we
partitioned the raw training data into ten randomly
chosen partitions and fine-tuned nine of these us-
ing the 10% held out portion to compute thresh-
olds. No synthetic or de-biasing data was included
in this submission.
We include ROC curves for half of these mod-
els in Figure 4, to illustrate that they are similar
but with some variance when used to score the test
data.






































Figure 4: ROC plots for AMI test set labels for
models pre-ensemble.
Our first unconstrained submission using major-
ity vote for AMI achieved scores of 0.738 for Task
A and 0.649 for Task B. The poorer score for Task
B is not surprising given that no bias mitigating
data or constraints were included in training.
4.2.3 Second Submission
In order to mitigate bias, we decided to augment
the training data set using sentences sampled from
the Italian Wikipedia articles that contain the 17
terms listed in the identity terms file provided with
the test set data. These sentences were labeled
as both non-misogynous and non-aggressive. 11K
sentences were used for this purpose, with the term
frequencies summarized in Table 3.


















Table 3: Term frequency in Wikipedia sampled
sentences for bias mitigation.
The second submission employed the same par-
titioning of data with a held-out set. However the
unconstrained data included the raw training data,
the provided synthetic data and our de-biasing
term data. As with submission 1, majority vote
was used with custom thresholds determined by
evaluation on the held-out set.
Our first unconstrained submission for AMI
achieved scores of 0.741 for Task A and 0.883 for
Task B.
5 Error Analysis
We discuss an informal analysis of the errors we
observed with each of these tasks. Aside from the
typical questions regarding data annotation qual-
ity, and the small sample sizes, we observed some
particular instances of avoidable errors.
5.1 HaSpeeDe2 Errors
Looking at the largest incongruities as shown in
Table 4 it is clear that context, which is unavail-
able to our models, and presumably to the mod-
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ID Comment HS Score
11355 @user @user @user Giustissimo, non bisogna mai nascondersi nelle ideologie,
sopratutto oggi perché non esistono più. Sta di fatto, che le cose più aberranti
che leggi oggi sui giornali hanno sempre@a@che fare con stranieri... o rom
URL
1 .00001
10803 #Simone di #CasalBruciato, #Roma: “Certi rom sono cittadini italiani, ma non
sono uguali a noi. Uguali non è il termine più giusto da usare”. URL
1 .00003
11288 I SOLDI DEI DISABILI AI MIGRANTI La regione Emilia Romagna destina
la metà dei fondi destinati alle fasce deboli a progetti per i richiedenti asilo A
Reggio Emilia il 69% delle risorse stanziate sono state utilizzate ai richiedenti
asilo #PRIMAGLIITALIANI URL
1 .00003
10420 #MeNeFottoDi questi sfigati #facciamorete che continuano a giustificare ogni
crimine commesso da immigrati... non fate rete, FATE SCHIFO... #facciamo-
ciFURBI
0 0.99996
11189 @user Naturalmente in questo caso alla faccia dei comunisti e dei migranti
stitici!
0 0.99996
10483 @user SCHIFOSA IPOCRITA SPONSORIZZI I MUSSULMANI E POI VOI
DARE I DIRITTI ALLE DONNE SI VEDE CHE SEI POSSEDUTA DAL
DIAVOLO SEI BUGIARDA BOLDRINA SAI SOLO PROTESTARE POI
TI CHIEDI PERCHÉ IL VERO ITALIANO TI ODIA PERCHÉ SEI UNA
SPORCA IPOCRITA
0 0.99995
Table 4: Largest Errors for hate speech classifier on HaSpeeDe2 Tweet data
erators, is important for determining the author’s
intent. The use of humor and the practice of quot-
ing text from another author are also confounding
factors. As this task is known to be hard (Vigna
et al., 2017; van Aken et al., 2018), the edge cases
display these confounding reasons. Additionally,
as evidenced by the last comment, the subtlety of
hate speech that is directed toward the designated
target for this challenge has not been well cap-
tured.
The BERT model that we fine-tuned for this ap-
plication is cased, and we see within our errors fre-
quent use of all-caps text. However, lower casing
the text has almost no effect on the scores, suggest-
ing that the BERT pre-training has already linked
the various cased versions of the tokens in the vo-
cabulary.
We analyzed the frequency of word piece frag-
ments in the data and saw no correlation between
misclassification and the presence of segmented
words. This suggests that vocabulary coverage in
the test set does not play a significant role in ex-
plaining our systems’ errors.
Considering the sentence with the high model
score for hate speech, several single terms are
tagged by the model. For example the term “sfi-
gati” occurs only once in the training data in a
sentence that is marked as non-hate speech. How-
ever, this term is not in our vocabulary and gets
split into pieces “sfiga##ti”, and the prefix “sfiga”
appears in two out of three training examples that
are marked hate speech—exactly the kind of data
sparsity that leads to unwanted bias. Using a larger
amount of training data, even if it creates an imbal-
ance, is one way to address this, as we did in the
case of the AMI challenge.
5.2 AMI
Because we are using ensemble models trained on
partitions of the training set, we observe that the
highest-scoring test samples that are marked non-
misogynous and non-aggressive, as well as the
lowest-scoring misogynous and aggressive com-
ments, vary from model to model. However, we
display the most frequently occurring mistakes
across all ten ensembles in Table 5.
Regarding the false alarms, these comments ap-
pear to be mislabeled test instances, and there is
ample support for this claim in the training data.
The first comment combines both uppercase and
a missing space. While it’s true that subjunctive
mode is not well represented in the training data,
lower casing this sentence produces high scores.
This is also the case with the third example. The
second error seems more subtle, perhaps an at-
tempt at humor, but one with no salient misogyny
terms.
6 Bias
Because the identity terms for AMI are not ob-
served with a high frequency in the test data, we
restrict our analysis to the synthetic data set. We
find wide variation in the performance of our in-
dividual models, with one model exhibiting very
poor performance across the subgroups. The sum-
mary of the AUC measurements for these models
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ID Comment Error Type
5466 Odio Sakura per il semplice motivo che qualunque cosa faccia o dica Naruto
lei lo prende a schiaffi o a pugniHA CHIESTO COME STA SAI DIOSANTO
BRUTTA STRONZA MA CONTRALLI MADONNA SPERO CHE TI UCCI-
DANOscusami Sarada
Missed Detection
5385 porca troia la prenderei a schiaffi se non fosse mia madre Missed Detection
5819 ma in tutto ciò lo scopo di anna qual è? far soffrire il mio protetto? IO TI
AMMAZZO COI LANCIAFIAMME OH #TemptationIsland
Missed Detection
5471 @danielita8811 Che bel culo tutto da sfondare False Alarm
5604 @coppiacalda2 Che bel culo da inculare False Alarm
Table 5: Persistent errors for AMI across different ensembles.
are shown in Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 7 using
the technique presented in (Borkan et al., 2019).
There does not appear to be a systemic problem
with bias in these models, but judging based only
upon synthetic data is probably unwise. The single
term “donna” from the test set shows a subgroup
AUC that drops substantially from the background
AUC for nearly all of the models, perhaps indicat-
ing limitations of judging based on synthetic data.
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Figure 5: Subgroup AUC
7 Conclusions and Future Work
Both of these challenges dealt with issues re-
lated to content moderation and evaluation of user-
generated content. While early research raised
fears of censorship, the ongoing challenges plat-
forms face have made it necessary to consider the
potential of machine learning. Advances in natu-
ral language understanding have produced models
that work surprisingly well, even ones that are able
to detect malicious intent that users try to encode
in subtle ways.
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Figure 6: Background Positive, Subgroup Nega-
tive AUC
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0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.26 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.94
0.98 0.97 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.21 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.95
0.97 0.97 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.47 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.93
0.97 0.96 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.23 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95
0.94 0.96 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.40 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.94
0.97 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.28 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.94
0.95 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.25 0.92 0.92 0.95 0.89
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Figure 7: Background Negative, Subgroup Posi-
tive AUC
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Our particular approach to the EVALITA chal-
lenges represented an unsurprising application of
what has now become a textbook technique: lever-
aging the resources of large pre-trained models.
However, many participants achieved nearly simi-
lar performance levels in the constrained task. We
regard this as a more impressive accomplishment.
Jigsaw continues to apply machine learning to
support publishers and to help them host quality
online conversations where readers feel safe par-
ticipating. The kinds of comments these chal-
lenges tagged are some of the most concerning
and pernicious online behaviors, far outside of the
norms that are tolerated in other public spaces.
But humans and machines both still misinterpret
profanity for hostility, and tagging humor, quo-
tations, sarcasm, and other legitimate expressions
for moderation remain serious problems.
Challenges like the AMI and HasSpeede2 com-
petitions underscore the importance of under-
standing the relationships between the parties in a
conversation, and the participants’ intents. We are
greatly encouraged that attributes that our systems
do not currently capture were somewhat within the
reach of our present techniques—but clearly much
work remains to be done.
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